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Sovereign Immunity-Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations
Operating Public Hospitals in North Carolina: Sides v. Cabarrus
Memorial Hospital
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity as first declared by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Moffitt v. City of Asheville' in 1889,
and as more recently affirmed by the court in Steelman v. City of New
Bern,2 municipal corporations enjoy immunity from suit in tort if the
tortious conduct complained of arose from the exercise of their governmental function. 3 However, there is no immunity from suit if the
municipal corporation caused the alleged tort while functioning in its
private or proprietary capacity. 4 The judicial classification of the vari-

ous activities undertaken by municipal corporations as either governmental .or proprietary is therefore crucial to the tort plaintiff seeking
damages from such entities under North Carolina law. In Sides v.
Cabarrus Memorial Hospital5 the North Carolina Supreme Court
confronted for the first time the question whether the construction,
maintenance, and operation of a hospital by a county or a city is a governmental or proprietary function. In holding that it was a proprietary
function, 6 and thus one in which the county or city was subject to
unlimited liability in tort, the court followed the modern trend of
restricting the doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to municipal
7
corporations.
1. 103 N.C. 237, 254, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889). See text accompanying notes 3233 infra.
2. 279 N.C. 589, 592-93, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1971). The plaintiff in Steelman urged the court to completely abrogate the doctrine as applied to municipal corporations. He contended that the court was the appropriate body to do so since it had
originally adopted the doctrine in North Carolina. The court refused to accept this
challenge; instead it affirmed the historical approach taken in Moffitt and deferred any
modifications or abrogations of the doctrine to the General Assembly. Id. at 594-95,
1894 S.E.2d at 242-43.
3. For a definition of a "governmental function" and a full discussion of the subject see notes 33-39 and accompanying text infra. The N.C. General Assembly has authorized municipal corporations to waive their immunity under specific circumstances.
N.C. GN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1974), allows municipal corporations to waive their tort
immunity for the operation of motor vehicles by purchasing liability insurance. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 153A-435 (1974), which is set forth in note 17 infra, permits a county
to waive its immunity in tort by purchasing liability insurance coverage. Under both
sections the waiver is only to the extent of such coverage.
4. For a definition of "proprietary function" and a more detailed discussion of
the subject see notes 33-39 and accompanying text infra.
5. 287 N.C. 14, 213 S.E.2d 297 (1975).
6. Id. at 24-25, 213 S.E.2d at 304.
7. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text infra.
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Plaintiff in Sides was the administrator of the estate of Mrs. Terry

Compton Sides. He instituted suit against Cabarrus Memorial Hospital and others,8 alleging negligence in the treatment and care of
the intestate which resulted in her personal injury and wrongful death.9
His claims against the hospital were based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Defendant hospital moved under rules 12(b)(1), (2) and
(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint. 10 It argued that Cabarrus Memorial Hospital was an agency of

the State of North Carolina, separate and apart from Cabarrus
County," and that therefore the North Carolina Tort Claims Act

2

8. The named defendants were: Cabarrus Memorial Hospital; Drs. J. Vincent
Arey and John R. Ashe, Jr., and their employer Cabarrus Clinic for Women P.A.; pathologists Drs. J.O. Williams and William J. Reeves; and nurse Nancy E. Deason. Brief
for Appellee at 3-4, Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hosp., 22 N.C. App. 117, 205 S.E.2d
784 (1974).
9. The plaintiff alleged that Mrs. Terry was admitted to the defendant hospital
on the evening of March 8, 1971 under the advice and care of Drs. Arey and Ashe for
the delivery of her third child, and that approximately one hour later she gave birth to
a healthy female child but subsequently began to lose blood. It was further alleged that
Nurse Deason, who was working for Drs. Reeves and Williams, failed to match and
cross match her blood when a transfusion was necessary, which contributed to the alleged negligent transfusion by Dr. Arey of B-positive blood into her body when her
blood type was A-negative. As a consequence of these alleged acts of negligence plaintiff contended that Mrs. Terry suffered a "transfusion reaction" resulting in great pain
and suffering and eventually her death. 287 N.C. at 15, 213 S.E.2d at 298. See also
Brief for Appellee at 3-10, Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hosp., 22 N.C. App. 117, 205
S.E.2d 784 (1974).
10. The grounds were that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter,
that the court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant, and that the plaintiff failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 287 N.C. at 15, 213 S.E.2d at 298.
11. 287 N.C. at 15, 213 S.E.2d at 298. Defendant's contention that Cabarrus
Memorial Hospital was an agency of the state, separate and apart from Cabarrus
County, was based upon defendant's interpretation of the Special Act of the General Assembly from which it derived its charter. See ch. 307, [1935] N.C. Pub.-Loc. L. 276.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Cum. Supp. 1975). This statute constitutes a
waiver by the state of North Carolina of its sovereign immunity from suit in tort up
to $30,000. This section reads as follows:
The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court
for the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board
of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State. The Industrial Commission shall determine
whether or not each individual claim arose as a result of a negligent act of
any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of the State while acting
within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, under
circumstances where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina. If
the Commission finds that there was such negligence on the part of an officer,
employee, involuntary servant, or agent of the State while acting within the
scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority, which was the
proximate cause of the injury and that there was no contributory negligence
on the part of the claimant or the person in whose behalf the claim is asserted,
the Commission shall determine the amount of damages which the claimant
is entitled to be paid, including medical and other expenses, and by appropriate
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placed exclusive jurisdiction of the claim in the North Carolina Industrial Commission, rather than in the superior court. Alternatively,
defendant argued that even if the hospital were found to be an agency
of the county, its operation was a governmental function and was insulated from suit in tort since there had been no waiver of its governmen14
tal immunity. 3 Treating the motion as one for summary judgment,
Superior Court Judge (now North Carolina Supreme Court Justice)

James G. Exum, Jr. rejected both of these arguments.
Holding that the hospital was an agency of Cabarrus County, not
of the State, 5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Judge

Exum's denial of summary judgment."0 It further ruled that the purchase of medical malpractice liability insurance for the hospital by the

County Commissioners constituted a waiver of the County's sovereign
immunity, thus making it subject to liability in tort in the superior court
to the extent of the insurance coverage. 17 Though the court of appeals
never directly addressed the issue, it is consistent with its analysis to
order direct the payment of such damages by the department, institution or
agency concerned, but in no event shall the amount of damages awarded exceed
the sum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000).
13. See notes 17, 20-21 and accompanying text infra.
14. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56.
15. 22 N.C. App. at 122, 205 S.E.2d at 788. The court devoted its entire opinion
to this issue. In holding that the hospital was an agency of the county, the court thereby
destroyed defendants' argument that section 143-291 of the General Statutes applied
since that section is limited to the state and its "agencies." Therefore the limited waiver
of sovereign immunity authorized by that section ($30,000) was not applicable. The
court based its decision on this issue on its interpretation of the special act of tile
General Assembly by which the hospital was authorized. Id. at 120-22, 205 S.E.2d at 787-88.
The court also relied upon several rulings by various state and federal agencies that the
hospital was an agency of the county. Id. at 122, 205 S.E.2d at 788.
16. 22 N.C. App. 117, 205 S.E.2d 784 (1974). The court accepted the hospital's
appeal under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(b) (1974) which provides that "[a]ny interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant or such party may
preserve his exception for determination upon any subsequent appeal in the cause."
17. 22 N.C. App. at 122-23, 205 S.E.2d at 788. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435(a)
(1974) allows a county to waive its sovereign immunity as to governmental functions
in this limited manner. This section reads as follows:
A county may contract to insure itself and any of its officers, agents, or
employees against liability for wrongful death or negligent or intentional damage to person or property or against absolute liability for damage to person or
property caused by an act or omission of the county or of any of its officers,
agents, or employees when acting within the scope of their authority and the
course of their employment. The board of commissioners shall determine what
liabilities and what officers, agents, and employees shall be covered by any insurance purchased pursuant to this subsection.
Purchase of insurance pursuant to this subsection waives the county's governmental immunity, to the extent of insurance coverage, for any act or omission occurring in the exercise of a governmental function. By entering into
an insurance contract with the county, an insurer waives any defense based
upon the governmental immunity of the county...
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assume that the court considered the County's operation of the hospital

to be a governmental function, 18 for otherwise the issue of waiver would
not have arisen.
The North Carolina Supreme Court devoted much of its opinion

to the affirmation of the court of appeals decision that the hospital was
an agency of Cabarrus County.' 9 However, because of its resolution

of the issue whether the operation of the hospital by Cabarrus County
was a governmental or proprietary function, 20 the court never reached
the lower courts' decision concerning the County's waiver of its sovereign immunity. 2 ' Holding that such an activity is proprietary in nature,
the court exposed Cabarrus Memorial, and all other similarly situated

hospitals, to unlimited liability in tort for the negligent acts of employ22
ees committed within the course and scope of their employment.

To evaluate the Sides decision properly, it is necessary to review

the judicial history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, specifically
as applied to municipal corporations, and to examine the present status

of its application to the operation of a hospital by such entities. The
doctrine of sovereign immunity apparently evolved in the English

common law from the monarchistic principle that "the King can do no
wrong." It followed from that assumption that there was no reason for
suits against the sovereign. 21 In 1798, Russell v. Men of Devon24

extended this principle in England to cover the activities of a county.
As was true of many other common law principles, the idea that govern-

ment could not be sued in tort without its consent was soon embraced
by American courts. 2-

The extension of the doctrine to the activities

18. This approach would have limited the plaintiff's recovery to the amount of liability insurance purchased by the county which would be a larger maximum than the
$30,000 in the Industrial Commission but still less than unlimited liability.
19. 287 N.C. at 16-20, 213 S.E.2d at 299-301. The court relied upon the same
rationale as the court of appeals. See note 16 supra.
20. 287 N.C. at 20, 213 S.E.2d at 301.
21. Id. at 26, 213 S.E.2d at 304.
22. Id. This holding is most favorable to the plaintiff since there is no limit to
the county's liability, as there would have been under the court of appeals approach and
under defendants' argument that jurisdiction was with the North Carolina Industrial
Commission.
23. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 970-71 (4th ed.
1971); 72 AM. Jun. 2d States, Territoriesand Dependencies § 99 (1974).
24. 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
25. E.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) in which Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion applied the doctrine to activities of the federal government.
The doctrine has also been applied to the activities of state governments at one time
by all the jurisdictions. W. PnossEn, supra note 23, at 975. See also Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), in which Mr. Justice Holmes stated that "[a]
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of a town was first accepted in the United States in 1812 in Mower
v. Inhabitants of Leicester,26 in which a Massachusetts court held that
no action at common law could be brought against a town for defective
highways.
The dual character of a municipal corporation, that it is at the
same time both a governmental unit and a corporation, was utilized by
a New York court in Bailey v. City of New York 27 in 1842 to limit
the immunity of these entities. In that case the court distinguished
between those activities of municipal corporations that were "public"
or "governmental" in nature and those that were "private" or "proprietary"; the court limited the tort immunity to those activities classified
as "public" or "governmental. 28
There are several policy reasons that have been historically reiterated to support the immunity of municipal corporations from suit in tort
when the activity involved can be classified as governmental in nature:
[T]he municipality derives no profit from the exercise of governmental functions, which are solely for the public benefit; . . .in

the performance of such duties public officers are agents of the
state and not of the corporation, so that the doctrine of respondent
superior does not apply; ... cities cannot carry on their govern-

ments if money raised by taxation for public use is diverted to
making good the torts of employees; and ...it is unreasonable to

hold the corporation liable for negligence in the performance of
duties imposed upon it by the legislature,
rather than voluntarily as29
sumed under its general powers.
At first the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the doctrine
of sovereign immunity and its application to municipal corporations.
In 1848 the court stated, "[b]ut -s the maxim is somewhat harsh in its
mildest sense, we are not disposed to extend its application ....",30
Although this view was again approved in 1885,1' the court eventually
accepted the doctrine's application to municipal corporations. Using
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
26. 9 Mass. 247, 6 Am. Dec. 63 (1812).
27. 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (N.Y. 1842).
28. Id. at 539-40. For an excellent historical account of this distinction and an
analysis of the Bailey decision see BARNETT, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of
Municipal Corporations: The Antecedents of Bailey v. City of New York, 16 OR. L.
REv. 250 (1937).
29. W. PRossER, supra note 23, at 978 (footnotes omitted).
30. Meares v. Commissioners of Wilmington, 31 N.C. 73, 86 (1848) (per
curiam).
31. Wright v. City of Wilmington, 92 N.C. 156, 159 (1885).
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the Bailey governmental-proprietary distinctions in Moffitt v. City of
Asheville 2 in 1889, the court held that:
The liability of cities and towns for the negligence of their officers or agents, depends upon the nature of the power that the
corporation is exercising, when the damage complained of is sustained ...
When such municipal corporations are acting . . in their
ministerial or corporate character ... they are impliedly liable for
damage caused by the negligence of officers or agents ....
On the other hand, where a city or town is exercising the
judicial, discretionary or legislative authority, conferred by its charter, or is discharging a duty, imposed solely for the benefit of the
public, it incurs no liability for the negligence of its officers. .... a3
This approach is the one still utilized by the court today.
An examination of the decisions in which the North Carolina
Supreme Court has had to draw the difficult line between governmental
and proprietary activities reveals that it has considered two factors to
be crucial. It has classified an activity as proprietary only when it has
involved a monetary charge of some type, 4 regardless of whether this
charge has generated a profit.3 5 On the other hand, the court has

classified as governmental only those activities that have historically
been performed by government rather than by private corporations."t
However, two further considerations enunciated by the court in Sides
32. 103 N.C. 237, 9 S.E. 695 (1889).
33. Id. at 254-55, 9 S.E. at 697.
34. 287 N.C. at 22, 213 S.E.2d at 302. See, e.g., Koontz v. City of WinstonSalem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972) (charge for use of garbate landfill); Glenn
v. City of Raleigh, 246 N.C. 469, 98 S.E.2d 913 (1957) (charge for admission to public
park); Foust v. City of Durham, 239 N.C. 306, 79 S.E.2d 519 (1954) (supplying water
to customers for which a charge was made and from which a profit was realized); Rice
v. City of Lumberton, 235 N.C. 227, 69 S.E.2d 543 (1952) (distributing electricity for
profit); Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 2.30 N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949) (operation
of an airport); Lowe v. City of Gastonia, 211 N.C. 564, 191 S.E. 7 (1937) (operation
of a golf course).
35. 287 N.C. at 23, 213 S.E.2d at 303. See, e.g., Glenn v. City of Raleigh, 246
N.C. 469, 98 S.E.2d 913 (1957) (charge collected for use of park did not meet operating
expenses, held operation of park was a proprietary function); Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949) (airport operated by the city at a loss yet
held to be a proprietary function).
36. 287 N.C. at 23, 213 S.E.2d at 303. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hayes v. Billings,
240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150 (1954) (erecting and maintaining a jail by a county); Hamilton v. Town of Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770 (195-3) (installation and maintenance of traffic light signals); Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N.C. 504, 193 S.E. 814 (1937)
(operation of police car); Cathey v. City of Charlotte, 197 N.C. 309, 148 S.E. 426
(1929) (erection and maintenance of police and fire alarm system); Howland v. City
of Asheville, 174 N.C. 749, 94 S.E. 524 (1917) (furnishing water for extinguishing
fires).
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exemplify the leeway built into the traditional tests that has allowed the

court to choose one classification or the other in order to effectuate its
policy goals or to "do justice" in a particular case. 7 First, even though
an activity may be labeled in general a governmental one, liability may
be attached to certain of its phases; and conversely, although an activity
may be determined in general to be proprietary, certain phases may

be held exempt from liability. 8 Secondly, even though prior cases
have held an identical activity to be of such a public necessity that
funds expended in connection with it were held to be for a public purpose, this prior determination does not guarantee that the classification
will be deemed governmental for tort purposes. 89
The imprecision of the governmental-proprietary test and the
court's ability to manipulate it in order to achieve a particular result
are especially evident in the Sides case. Although Sides presented the
North Carolina Supreme Court with an issue of first impression, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had earlier held in Hitchings v. Albe-

marie Hospital ° that if presented with the issue of immunity of a
municipal hospital, the North Carolina Supreme Court would construe
such an activity to be governmental in nature.4 The Hitchings deci37. 'In Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 528, 186 S.E.2d 897, 907
(1972) Mr. Justice Branch said: "[Aipplication of [the governmental-proprietary distinction] to given factual situations has resulted in irreconcilable splits of authority and
confusion as to what functions are governmental and what functions are proprietary."
The same opinion is expressed in Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the
Governmental or ProprietaryTest, 22 VA. L.REv. 910, 938 (1936), in which the author
states that "[t]he rules sought to be established are as logical as those governing French
irregular verbs."
38. 287 N.C. at 21, 213 S.E.2d at 302. Compare Woodie v. Town of North
Wilkesboro, 159 N.C. 353, 74 S.E. 924 (1912) (operation of municipal water plant held
proprietary) with Klassette v. Drug Co., 227 N.C. 353, 42 S.E.2d 411 (1947) and Mabe
v. City of Winston-Salem, 190 N.C. 486, 130 S..E. 169 (1925) (furnishing of water to
extinguish fires held governmental).
39. 287 N.C. at 22, 213 S.E.2d at 302. Compare Turner v. City of Reidsville, 224
N.C. 42, 29 S.E.2d 211 (1944) (expenditure of public funds for construction and maintenance of airport was for a public purpose) with Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 230 N.C.
134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949) (operation and maintenance of airport a proprietary function); compare James v. City of Charlotte, 183 N.C. 630, 112 S.E. 423 (1922) (city
engaged in governmental function when it removed garbage for its inhabitants for a fee
that covered only its actual collection and disposal expenses) with Koontz v. City of
Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972) (city engaged in proprietary function in operating a landfill for disposal of garbage where city had contracted with county
to dispose of county garbage for a fee).
40. 220 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1955).
41. Id. at 718. The court reasoned as follows:
We must, of course, follow the law of North Carolina. No case directly
in point has been found. We think, however, that the North Carolina cases
show a distinct tendency to hold to the so-called majority rule, which would
grant immunity in the instant case. We think, under these cases, the munici-
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sion therefore points out that another well qualified court can apply the
same tests utilized in Sides and yet reach the opposite conclusion
concerning immunity.
Although Hitchings rather than Sides represents the majority rule
in the United States as to municipal hospital liability,42 this rule, like
43
the doctrine of charitable immunity, is being increasingly abandoned.
Modem courts often apply the traditional classification tests in such a
way as to restrict rather than to extend the tort immunity of municipal
corporations, especially when they are considering the operation of a
public hospital. The reason for this judicial trend is that "thetraditional
arguments used to justify municipal tort immunity are no longer considered valid. The most plausible of these justifications was based upon
the fact that municipal activities and treasuries were extremely limited;
courts therefore concluded that holding municipalities liable for
the torts of their employees would place an unbearable burden upon
cities' treasuries, thus adversely affecting their service to the public."
Today, however, municipal operations have mushroomed to encompass
a myriad of activities. Also, municipal revenues have grown dramatically on account of new tax levies and direct payments from citizens for
services rendered. Considering the relatively inexpensive availability
of liability insurance, the cost of paying for the torts of municipal
employees can be absorbed as a normal operating expense. This additional outlay from the municipal treasury appears inconsequential when
viewed against the gross inequity involved in totally denying relief to
a tort victim just because his injury is attributable to the actions of a
municipal employee or agent performing a governmental function.4"
palities here were, in operating the hospital, exercising a goverunental func-

tion. Certainly, the health of its citizens is a matter of grave public concern
to a State, or municipal subdivisions thereof.
Id.
42. For a state-by-state analysis see II A HosprrAs LAw MANUAL, Negligence, Immunity to Suit, Section 3, 45-55 (1973); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 203 (1952).
43. See note 42 supra. For a thorough discussion of the demise of the doctrine
of charitable immunity see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).
The North Carolina Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity
as applied to hospitals in North Carolina in Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., Inc., 269
N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).

44. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
45. Commentators for years have been calling for the abrogation of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.L 1, 129, 229 (1924); Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MiNN. L. Ruv.
751 (1956); Note, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964
DUKE L.J. 888; Note, Judicial Abrogation of the Doctrine of Municipal Immu-

nity to Tort Liability, 41 N.C.L. REv. 290 (1963).
1198 (1958); Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1376 (1939).

See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d
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The North Carolina court
was cognizant of these considerations in
46
reaching its result in Sides.
Although adhering to the historical classification approach, the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Sides joined the ranks of a growing
minority of jurisdictions that have refused to extend the immunity doctrine to the operation of a hospital by a municipal corporation. Noting
the existence of this judicial trend and approving the policy reasons
supporting it, the court applied the traditional tests and found that the
hospital derived "substantial revenues" from room rents, nursing care,
and laboratory work. 7 It also found that the operation of a public
hospital was not one of the "traditional" services rendered by local governments. 48 Therefore, the court concluded that this activity possessed
all of the characteristics that had been traditionally labeled as proprietary in nature.
The Sides decision indicates that, although steadfast in its refusal
to modify or abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity, considering
any such action exclusively within the domain of the General Assembly, 49 the court is nevertheless willing to manipulate the traditional
classification tests to ensure that the doctrine's coverage is not extended. Had it not so strongly desired to hold the hospital accountable
for the acts of its employees, the court could just as easily have concluded, as did the Fourth Circuit in Hitchings, that the operation of a
public hospital is a uniquely governmental function and is therefore
shielded from liability.
In conclusion, it must be noted that the Sides decision may have
a significant impact on future cases involving the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to other activities of municipal corporations.
As a practical matter, this decision indicates that a tort plaintiff seeking
damages from a municipal corporation and alleging negligence on the
part of the municipality's employees or agents should structure his arguments within the framework of the traditional tests applied by the court
in Sides, rather than attempting to convince he court to abrogate the
immunity of such entities entirely. In a case in which there is not
strong North Carolina precedent for classifying the municipal activity
involved as governmental, the plaintiffs chances for recovery are
46.
47.
48.
49.
(1971).

287 N.C. at 24, 213 S.E.2d at,304.
Id. at 24, 213 S.E.2d at 303. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
id. at 25, 213 S.E.2d at 304. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
E.g., Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243
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excellent considering the court's statement in Sides that in cases of

doubtful applicability, the rule should be resolved against the municipality. 50
F. JOSEPi TREACY JR.

Workmen's Compensation-Apportionment
Limited Under the North Carolina Act

of Disabilities Is

The purpose' of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation
Act 2 is to relieve employees injured in industrial accidents from the cost
of their resulting disabilities by passing the cost on to the consuming
public.3 To effectuate this purpose the Supreme Court of North Carolina has adopted a policy of liberal construction of the Act, particularly
of the coverage clauses 4 In Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co.,5
a case of first impression, 6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that a disability resulting from an industrial accident aggravation
of a previous non-compensable injury cannot be apportioned under
the North Carolina Act: the employer is responsible for the entire
disability.7 In so holding, the court followed the rule adopted by
50. 287 N.C. at 25, 213 S.E.2d at 304.
1. The North Carolina Act itself contains no statement of purpose; the purpose
may be inferred from the critics' discussions of the North Carolina Act and the Workmen's Compensation Acts generally. See note 3 infra. The North Carolina Supreme
Court has spelled out the purpose of the Act in several decisions, e.g., Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966); Lewis v. W.B. Lea Tobacco Co., 260 N.C. 410, 412, 132 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1963); Kellams v. Carolina Metal
Prods., Inc., 248 N.C. 199, 203, 102 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1958).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1972), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975).
3. ComrmissioN OF THE AMEwICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: REPORT UPON OPERATION OF STATE LAws 13 (1914); Malone, The Limits of
Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-the Dual Requirement Reappraised, 51 N.C.L.
REv. 705 (1973).
4. E.g., Hollman v. Public Util. Dep't, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882
(1968); Hall v. Thomason Chevrolet, Inc., 263 N.C. 569, 576, 139 S.E.2d 857, 862
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